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RANGKA KERJA PENGIRAAN KUANTITATIF BAGI MENGANALISA 
BUKTI-BUKTI UNTUK MENGENALPASTI TUJUAN SERANGAN DI 
DALAM FORENSIK RANGKAIAN  
ABSTRAK 
Peningkatan jumlah jenayah siber telah mendorong para pengkaji di dalam bidang 
forensik rangkaian membangunkan teknik-teknik yang baru untuk menganalisa dan 
menyiasat jenayah ini. Walaupun jenayah siber menghasilkan jumlah bukti yang banyak, 
analisis dan ukuran terhadap kesan daripada kerosakan yang disebabkan oleh jenayah ini 
adalah sukar kerana jumlah bukti yang terlalu besar di dalam setiap kes. Hal ini telah 
menjadikan kos penyiasatan kes jenayah siber masa kini begitu mahal dan memerlukan 
masa yang panjang. Tambahan pula, teknik-teknik ini menggunakan proses aktif dan 
reaktif untuk menganalisis jenayah siber, dan proses ini bermula selepas jenayah siber ini 
dikenalpasti, dan seterusnya menyebabkan pengenalpastian bukti-bukti penting menjadi 
sukar. Selain itu, maklumat yang diperlukan untuk memahami dan menganalisa faktor-
faktor jenayah siber seperti tujuan dan strategi jenayah ini juga adalah terhad.  
Tesis ini mencadangkan satu rangka kerja baru untuk menganalisis bukti-bukti 
jenayah siber. Rangka kerja ini bertujuan untuk menggunakan bukti-bukti jenayah untuk 
membina semula tujuan serangan dan menganggar strategi-strategi serangan yang 
serupa. Tujuan serangan dikenalpasti menerusi algoritma baru yang dikenali sebagai 
Analisis Tujuan Serangan, yang meramalkan tujuan jenayah siber dengan 
menggabungkan teori Dempster-Shafer dengan teknik rangkaian penyebab. Strategi 
serangan serupa telah dianggarkan dengan menggunakan salah satu daripada kaedah 
yang dicadangkan. Kaedah pertama ialah dengan mencipta satu model baru 
menggunakan bukti-bukti berkenaan apabila tujuan jenayah siber tidak dapat dikesan. 
Model ini bertujuan untuk mengukur bukti-bukti serupa antara kes-kes jenayah siber 
xxii 
 
baru dengan yang lampau untuk menganggarkan strategi yang serupa. Kaedah kedua 
pula dijelaskan dengan mereka bentuk algoritma baru yang dikenali sebagai Persamaan 
Strategi Serangan yang menggabungkan kaedah pertama dengan pra-analisis faktor-
faktor tujuan untuk menambah-baik keputusan analisa jenayah siber ini. Pra-analisis bagi 
tujuan serangan ini dinilai dengan menggunakan satu kaedah baru yang dikenali sebagai 
Persamaan Tujuan Serangan, yang menggunakan persamaan metrik untuk 
menganggarkan tujuan jenayah siber yang serupa. Tujuan dan strategi serangan 
digunakan untuk membandingkan kes baru dengan kes sedia ada yang didokumenkan 
untuk meningkatkan kebarangkalian bukti-bukti jenayah siber yang sepadan dengan 
potensi kes-kes yang serupa. Oleh itu, perbandingan ini telah memaksimakan 
kebarangkalian penemuan seperti padanan dan peratusan persamaan antara kes-kes 
dengan menggunakan teknik penaakulan berasaskan kes untuk menyediakan bukti 
berguna yang dapat membantu penyiasat kelak.  
Rangka kerja yang dicadangkan ini telah dinilai dengan menggunakan data trafik 
rangkaian sebenar yang diperolehi daripada makmal kajian USM dan juga cabaran set 
data forensik oleh Projek Honeynet. Keputusan kajian menunjukkan rangka kerja ini 
mampu memaksimakan nilai kebarangkalian secara purata sebanyak (9.17%) untuk 
mendapat kes-kes serupa, yang dapat membantu penyiasat untuk menyelesaikan jenayah 
siber dengan mengkaji kes-kes yang serupa ini, sekaligus membolehkan mereka 
mengadaptasikan jalan penyelesaian untuk kes yang baru. Kajian ini menunjukkan suatu 
rangka kerja baru untuk menganalisa bukti-bukti yang dapat meningkatkan proses 
penyiasatan menerusi aktiviti membuat keputusan  yang lebih baik yang dapat membantu 
dalam memberkas penjenayah sebenar.  
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QUANTITATIVE COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING 
EVIDENCE TO IDENTIFY ATTACK INTENTION AND STRATEGY IN 
NETWORK FORENSICS 
ABSTRACT 
The increasing number of cyber crimes has motivated network forensics researchers 
to develop new techniques to analyze and investigate these crimes. Although cyber 
crimes produce a large volume of evidence, analyzing and measuring the extent of 
the damages caused by these crimes are difficult because of the overwhelming 
amount of evidence involved in each case. Thus, current cyber crime investigation 
techniques are costly and time consuming. In addition, these techniques normally use 
active and reactive processes to analyze cyber crimes, and such processes start after 
the cyber crime has been identified, which makes identifying useful evidence 
difficult. Moreover, the information required to understand and analyze cyber crime 
factors such as the intention and strategy of the crime are limited. 
This thesis proposes a new framework to analyze cyber crime evidence. The 
proposed framework aims to use cyber crime evidence to reconstruct attack 
intentions and estimate similar attack strategies. The intentions are identified through 
a new algorithm called Attack Intention Analysis, which predicts cyber crime 
intentions by combining Dempster-Shafer theory and a causal network. Similar 
attack strategies have been estimated by using one of the two proposed methods. The 
first method creates a new model that uses evidence when the intentions for a cyber 
crime are undetected. This model aims to measure similar evidence between new and 
pre-existing cyber crime cases to estimate similar strategies. The second method is 
illustrated by designing a new algorithm called Similarity of Attack Strategies, which 
integrates the first method with the pre-analyzed intention factors to improve the 
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results of the cyber crime analysis. The pre-analyzed intention is evaluated by using 
a new algorithm called Similarity of Attack Intentions, which uses a similarity metric 
to estimate similar cyber crime intentions. The attack intentions and strategies are 
used to compare a new case with existing documented cases to increase the 
possibility of matching cyber crime evidences with potential similar cases. Thus, this 
comparison maximizes the probability of finding such matches and maximizes the 
percentage similarities between cases by using the case-based reasoning technique to 
provide useful evidence that will assist investigators. 
The proposed framework was evaluated by using real network data traffic 
obtained in the USM research labs and from the forensics challenge dataset by the 
Honeynet Project. The experimental results showed that the proposed framework 
maximize the probability value in average by (9.17%) of retrieving similar cases, 
which can help the investigators to resolve a cyber crime by studying similar cases, 
thereby enabling them to adapt a solution for the new case. This study presents a new 
framework for analyzing evidence which can enhance the investigation process 
through better decision making activities that will help in apprehending the real 
perpetrators. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Overview  
Nowadays, cyber crimes are increasing and have affected large organizations with 
highly sensitive information. For example, the International Monetary Fund 
information system was compromised by a sophisticated attack for over a month in 
2011 (Wolf and Maclean, 2011; BBC, 2011). The databases of major companies 
such as Sony Group and Google have also been penetrated by several anonymous 
computer hackers who stole personal data such as passwords from customer accounts 
(Jeremy, 2011, Runciman, 2012). Consequently, the affected organizations spent 
more resources analyzing the cyber crimes rather than detecting and preventing these 
crimes. Network forensics plays an important role in investigating cyber crimes; it 
helps organizations resolve cyber crimes as soon as possible without incurring a 
significant loss. 
In general, the evidence is everything that is used to demonstrate and determine 
the truth of an assertion in order to support resolving of cyber crimes. Cyber crimes 
produce a large volume of evidence through network monitoring and capturing tools. 
Nevertheless, a significant amount of time is required to discover the real perpetrator. 
According to the 2011 CyberSecurity Watch survey, 21% of digital crimes are 
caused by “unknown” perpetrator (CERT et al., 2011). This fact encourages the 
perpetrators to repeat the cyber crimes. In the case of Sony, the 2011 attacks 
launched by a group of hackers who call themselves “LulzSec” penetrated a number 
of Sony sites and stole customers’ data. This incident indicates that the current 
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network forensic investigation approach, which is reactive, is time consuming, 
costly, and error prone as it requires much effort to analyze the overwhelming 
amount of evidence presented in each case. Moreover, gathering useful evidence 
through the reactive approaches such as proposed by Rogers et al. (2006), Freiling 
and Schwittay (2007), and Almulhem (2009) is difficult because evidence is 
collected right after the detection of the cyber crime. Thus, a new approach is needed 
to analyze evidence and enhance the investigation process. 
Most existing frameworks and models in network forensics such as proposed by 
Carrier and Spafford (2003), Baryamureeba and Tushabe (2004), Rogers et al. 
(2006), Freiling and Schwittay (2007), Almulhem (2009), Pilli et al. (2010), and 
Alharbi et al. (2011a) serve as a guideline in the investigation of cyber crimes 
without enough information or details on how to analyze the evidence. In addition, 
the vagueness of each phase processes is a gap exists in the network forensic phases 
of these frameworks and models. This gap exists because investigators have 
difficulty understanding how the phases work and how the outcomes for each phase 
are achieved. Considerable time is consumed to understand the phases as the 
researchers focus on the number and ordering of phases rather than the core 
operations inside these phases (Almulhem, 2009; Pilli et al., 2010; Alharbi et al., 
2011a). 
Based on various existing digital forensic approaches, Pilli et al. (2010) introduced a 
generic process model for network forensics. The proposed model has multiple 
processes embedded into nine phases: preparation, detection, incident response, 
collection, preservation, examination, analysis, investigation, and presentation. The 
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investigation phase plays an important role in decision making to resolve cyber 
crimes. However, as mentioned by Casey (2005), the investigation phase is complex. 
The analysis phase supports the investigation phase in the latter’s aim to improve the 
quality of decision making. The analysis phase analyzes the evidence of a cyber 
crime and generates important observations to establish the intention and strategy of 
the crime (Pilli et al., 2010). Attack intentions are plan instances selected for 
processing to achieve a goal and infers the motive of an attack based on the cyber 
crime actions. Attack strategy explains how the cyber crime is done and identifies the 
steps of the attack to generate a scenario. The analysis of large volumes of cyber 
crime evidence is a challenging issue (Wang et al., 2006a).  
In conclusion, given the large amount of cyber crime evidences, considerable 
effort, time, and resources are required in collecting, analyzing, and summarizing 
useful evidence that help investigators establish a suitable decision. However, 
identifying intentions and strategies of cyber crimes is difficult for most investigators 
in network forensics. In general, the analysis phase attempts to establish the motive 
of a cyber crime and how the attack occurred by identifying the intentions and 
strategies of the crime. Unfortunately, with the increasing number of cyber crimes, 
these issues remain unaddressed and require more time and budget. This study 
demonstrates the need to improve the quality of the investigation phase through 
enhancing the process of evidence analysis. Such improvement includes producing 
useful evidence such as predicting the intention and establishing similar strategies of 
cyber crime cases to discover similar cases, thereby reducing the effort and 
processing cost during the investigation phase. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
The analysis phase clarifies the intentions and methodology of the attack and 
provides a feedback to improve the security tools (Pilli et al., 2010). The analysis 
phase  support  the investigation phase of network forensics, and has a knowledge 
gap, which reconstructing useful evidence of a cyber crime is difficult 
(Baryamureeba and Tushabe, 2004; Freiling and Schwittay, 2007; Almulhem, 2009; 
Pilli et al., 2010). This gap caused by the vagueness of the analysis phase processes. 
The analysis phase is challenging because it provides detailed information on the 
intention and strategy of the attack. Therefore, generating useful evidence in the 
investigation phase to measure the impact of a cyber crime is difficult and more 
costly in terms of capital and resources. 
The main challenge faced by this research is to design a series of processes that 
analyzes the evidence of an attack to increase the overall speed of the investigation 
process. This challenge is phrased as the following research problem: 
 How can an efficient framework that analyzes attack evidence for network 
forensics be designed? 
Addressing this problem requires a new framework to analyze evidence. The 
framework proposed in this study involves designing a set of processes and 
algorithms in the network forensic analysis phase that uses cyber crime evidence to 
reconstruct cyber crime intentions and establish similar strategies. This framework 
aims to directly analyze the cyber crime evidence and to maximize the probability 
value of retrieving similar cases. 
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1.3 Research Motivation 
According to CERT et al. (2011), cyber crime attacks incurred an average monetary 
loss of $123,000 per organization in the USA in 2011. Ponemon (2011) reported that 
the annual cost of solving cyber crimes is $5.9 million. Ponemon’s study is based on 
a representative sample of 50 organizations in various industrial sectors in the USA. 
The cost incurred by cyber crimes per company ranges from $1.5 million to $36.5 
million each year, as shown in Figure 1.1. In reality, a strong relationship exists 
between the time required to resolve a cyber crime and the cost. Based on a previous 
study (Ponemon, 2011), cyber crimes could become costly if they are not resolved 
quickly. Current investigation techniques are very costly and time consuming 
because extensive effort is required to analyze the overwhelming amount of evidence 
presented in each cyber crime case. In addition, gathering useful evidence is difficult 
because most techniques utilize active and reactive processes to analyze cyber 
crimes; such processes start right after the detection of the cyber crime.  
 
Figure ‎1.1: Key Benchmark Sample statistics on the Annualized Cyber Crime Cost, 
(Ponemon, 2011) 
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Figure 1.2 indicates that the average time to resolve a cyber attack is 18 days, 
with an average cost of $415,748 for the participating organizations over the 18-day 
period. 
 
Figure ‎1.2: Average Days to Resolve an Attack for Seven Attack Types, (Ponemon, 
2011) 
In general, the amount of evidence collected by network forensic tools is huge. 
Most organizations do not pursue legal actions against perpetrators of cyber crimes 
because of the lack of useful evidence and sufficient information to prosecute the 
perpetrators (CERT et al., 2011). Defensive security approaches such as Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Protection System (IPS) were developed 
recently to detect, prevent, and establish a perspective of network attacks. Cyber 
crime evidence must be analyzed more intensively to generate clear and useful 
evidence and establish a more suitable decision in the investigation phase. Attack 
intentions should be predicted and similar attack strategies should be identified in the 
analysis phase. Maximizing the probability of retrieving similar cases is also helpful 
because it minimizes the amount of time and processing cost required to resolve 
cyber crime cases by analyzing the most similar cases.   
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Most attack analysis approaches are based on alert correlation techniques. These 
techniques are connected to network forensic tool for assistance such as IDS to 
understand and analyze the cyber crime occurrence. The drawback of most of these 
techniques is that they are developed to prevent future attacks and minimize damage 
and not to analyze the cyber crimes through network forensics (Wei and Thomas, 
2008; Huang et al., 1999; Damiano et al., 2009; Wang and Peng, 2009). Thus, 
innovative methods and techniques are needed in the analysis of the attacks to 
increase the amount of evidence by establishing the attack intention and strategy in 
advance, and to help investigators in their decision making and in resolving cyber 
crimes (Almulhem, 2009).  
The study of attack intentions provides more details about the features of the crime 
and the behavior of the attacker. The features are distinctive characteristics of the 
attack. It includes IP addresses, ports, type of services and protocol, etc. Attack 
intentions can be utilized as a useful piece of evidence to enhance the investigation 
process through decision making and to apprehend the real perpetrator. The most 
common techniques for attack intention analysis depend on determining the intention 
from the attack path as reported by Peng et al. (2009), Wang and Peng (2009), Wu et 
al. (2009), Feng et al. (2011), and Hao et al. (2011). The drawback of these 
techniques is that they are not suitable for large amounts of evidence limited to a 
specific type of evidence, and cannot present all the attack intentions. These 
techniques work only with a specific type of attack, such as Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDOS) attacks. Furthermore, these techniques were developed to enhance 
IDS, not to specifically analyze evidence in network forensics. 
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Determining the attack strategy allows network forensic investigators to easily 
draw a possible comprehensive frame of the cyber crime case. Thus, establishing 
similar attack strategies maximizes the probability of retrieving similar cases. Cyber 
crime attack strategies have become increasingly sophisticated, which makes the 
identification of an accurate attack strategy extremely difficult (Wei and Thomas, 
2008). One example is a multi-stage attack in which the evidence is distributed 
among various sources. Most attack strategy techniques depend on alert correlation 
(Wei and Thomas, 2008; Damiano et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2009; Wang and Peng, 
2009). However, these techniques have a number of limitations. For instance, they 
require a large number of predefined attributes, difficult to implement, and employed 
only to prevent future attacks and minimize damage. 
The processes in network forensic evidence analysis require new techniques for 
different types of attacks. Attack evidence analysis requires computational 
techniques, such as a mathematical methods and graph theories for examining similar 
cases, thereby reducing the investigative efforts. This research is conducted to 
retrieve similar cyber crime cases by analyzing evidence through the identification of 
attack intention and establishment of similar attack strategies. The analysis of 
evidence helps investigators eliminate similar cases, which reduces the time and cost 
of investigation and allows investigators to solve new cases by analyzing the results 
of previous similar cases.  
1.4 Goal, Objectives and Scope of the Research  
The main goal of this research is to propose a new framework to analyze digital 
evidence and increase the possibility of obtaining cyber crime evidence. The 
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proposed framework can increase the probability value of retrieving similar cases. 
The work is divided into the following three main objectives:  
 To identify the attack intentions of a cyber crime through a method that 
focuses on the reason for the attack for uncertain intentions. Attack intentions 
will be analyzed to better understand the motivation behind cyber crimes.  
 To establish similar cyber crime strategies through evidence and pre-analyzed 
attack intentions. The established value will be used to increase the 
possibility of obtaining evidence to retrieve similar cyber crime cases. 
 To evaluate the new evidence analysis framework. The new framework will 
show the significance of identifying intentions and establishing similar cyber 
crime strategies in increasing the probability value of retrieving similar cases 
during the investigation process. 
The scope of this research focuses on the analysis phase of the generic process 
model for network forensics proposed by Pilli et al. (2010) because the model is 
comprehensive and is based on various existing digital forensic models. This 
research analyzes cyber crime evidence to efficiently and clearly establish the attack 
intentions and similar attack strategies, thereby supporting the investigation phase. 
Figure 1.3 presents the general research overview that indicates the scope of the 
study.  
The main assumption of this research is that evidence collection and 
classification are predefined in the previous phase. Moreover, the research assumes 
that the depository of proactive network forensics is utilized to preserve and restore 
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cyber crime evidence and analysis results. Thus, this research presents the 
components of each evidence classification and the proactive forensics depository to 
show the integrity and the dependency relationship between the analysis phase and 
other phases in the general network forensic model.   
   
Figure ‎1.3: Scope of the Research  
1.5 Research Methodology 
This research applies a series of steps by combining methods from the statistical and 
similarity measurements to analyze evidence. This research proposes a new 
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framework to analyze cyber crime evidence from different perspectives to generate 
useful evidence that can be utilized to improve the investigation phase. Evidence is 
analyzed to identify the intentions of the attack and establish similar attack strategies. 
The identified intentions and strategies are then compared with pre-existing 
documented cases to increase the possibility of matching cyber crime evidence with 
potential similar cases, thereby maximizing the probability of discovering a precise 
match and increasing the percentage of similarities among cases. Figure 1.4 shows 
the research process, which includes the input process, processing, and output 
process. 
 
Figure ‎1.4: Process of the Research Overview 
The research is conducted in four phases, as shown in Figure 1.5. The first phase 
is a preliminary study of the research problem, which is analyzing cyber crime 
evidence. The second phase determines the requirements that support the evidence 
analysis, such as tools, data sets, theories, and techniques. The theoretical framework 
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is established, as shown in Figure 1.6. The requirements determined in this phase 
verify the integrity of the analysis phase with other phases in network forensics. 
 
Figure ‎1.5: Research Methodology Process 
  
Figure ‎1.6: Theoretical framework 
Network Capturing, Monitoring and Forensics Analysis Tools 
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The third phase is the design of the components of the proposed framework. The 
data set is collected in this phase by capturing the network traffic from our university 
laboratories and monitoring for any suspicious attack. The proposed framework also 
utilizes the general network forensic datasets from the Honeynet Project (Werner, 
2010). The datasets are manipulated and analyzed by using selected network forensic 
tools such as Wireshark (Wireshark, 2011) and Snort (Snort, 2010). The main 
purpose of this phase is to design suitable algorithms to analyze evidence. This phase 
also establishes a new algorithm that predicts attack intentions by combining the 
mathematical Dempster–Shafer (D–S) evidence theory with a probabilistic technique 
through a causal network. Furthermore, an extended algorithm is designed from the 
proposed attack intention algorithm to establish similar attack strategies through 
cosine similarity measurements. 
 Lastly, once the components of the attack intentions and strategies have been 
established, the proposed framework is applied to each component. The CBR 
technique is utilized to identify similar cases among the new cyber crime cases to 
help investigators solve cyber crimes efficiently. The proposed framework is 
evaluated to emphasize the significance and efficiency of the attack intention and 
strategy analysis in increasing the possibility of obtaining evidence as well as 
maximizing the probability of identifying similar cases.  
1.6 Contributions of the Research  
This research contributes a new framework for analyzing attack evidence to predict 
attack intentions and establish similar strategies, thereby increasing the possibility of 
obtaining cyber crime evidence. This contribution makes the investigation process 
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even more effective by maximizing the probability of identifying similar cases as 
well as helping in apprehending the real crime perpetrator. The contributions are as 
follows: 
 A new algorithm called Attack intention Analysis (AIA) to analyze attack 
intentions by combining the mathematical D–S evidence theory with a 
probabilistic technique through a causal network. The algorithm is utilized to 
predict attack intentions, thereby providing useful evidence. 
 A similarity process model to estimate attack strategy when the intentions 
behind a cyber crime are unknown. The model utilizes cosine similarity 
measurements based on evidence classification to identify similar cyber crime 
strategies. 
 A new algorithm called Similarity of Attack Strategy (SAS) to establish cyber 
crime strategies based on the intentions behind a cyber crime. The algorithm 
integrates the similarity process model and pre-analyzed attack intentions to 
expedite the investigation process by maximizing the ranking of similar cyber 
crime cases.  
 A new framework to analyze evidence and evaluate the efficiency of 
identifying intentions and establishing similar cyber crime strategies through 
network forensic analysis tools and the CBR technique. The new framework 
retrieves similar cyber crime cases with a high probability value.  
1.7 Thesis Outline 
This chapter presents the basic concepts and states the problem. In addition, this 
chapter presents the scope, goal, and objectives as well as the motivations, 
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methodology, and contributions of this research. The remainder of this thesis 
provides the background and details of attack evidence analysis. Chapter two 
presents a literature review on the four domains of this research: current network 
forensic approaches, analysis phase in network forensics, attack intention analysis 
methods, and attack strategy analysis methods. The chapter focuses on the main 
challenges faced by network forensic analysis approaches and how previous studies 
addressed the disadvantages of the network forensic analysis process models and 
techniques.  
Chapter three presents the proposed framework to analyze evidence in network 
forensics. This chapter describes the components of the proposed framework and 
clarifies the theoretical framework that includes all the components of the proposed 
framework. It discusses all the proposed algorithms for attack intentions and similar 
attack strategies. Chapter four presents the design and implementation of the 
proposed framework components. It discusses all the components for attack 
intentions and similar attack strategies  
Chapter five presents the experimental results of the proposed framework. The 
chapter evaluates the efficiency of the proposed framework and reveals the 
significance of its components. Chapter six concludes this thesis and summarizes the 
main contributions of this research. The chapter provides suggestions for future 
studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature on the analysis of cyber crime evidence in network 
forensics and cites previous and current studies related to the aforementioned 
research field. It focuses on previous network forensic approaches and how the 
analysis phase was presented in these approaches. It shows how this research fills the 
gap in network forensic knowledge, which depends on an efficient analysis of 
evidence. The chapter also reveals the necessity of this research and discusses the 
main tools and techniques utilized in the network forensic approach. Attack 
intentions and strategy methods are considered the main factors that improve the 
decision making process during the investigation phase in network forensics.  
This research addresses the related studies in four main parts. The first part, 
which will be explained in the next section, discusses cyber crime and the 
fundamentals of network forensics, such as the definitions, main challenges, and 
network forensic analysis and monitoring tools. The second part, Section 2.3, 
introduces the current network forensic process models. These models are also 
compared to justify the proposed framework. The third part, Section 2.4, discusses 
the analysis phase in network forensics and the intentions and strategies of the attack 
analysis methods. The fourth part, Section 2.5, describes the implementation 
techniques utilized by network forensic approaches. These techniques are also 
compared to justify the Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) technique as a potential 
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solution to retrieve similar cyber crime cases as well as to evaluate the efficiency of 
the proposed framework.  
2.2 Fundamentals of Network Forensics 
This section defines cyber crime as well as network forensics with its main 
challenges. It presents the main network forensic analysis and monitoring tools. 
2.2.1 Cyber Crimes 
“Cyber crime” refers to any crime that involves computer or network communication 
which may have been used to establish the crime or which may be the target. The 
United States Department of Justice defines computer crime as “any violation of 
criminal law that involves knowledge of computer technology for their perpetration, 
investigation, or prosecution” (Parker et al., 1989). Most cyber crimes occur because 
of the proliferation of different types of attacks, such as Trojan, phishing, and 
spoofing attacks, in computer networks. 
According to Gandhi et al. (2011), the nature of the attack and the motive behind 
it should be identified to better understand cyber crime and to resolve it within a 
shorter time and at a lower cost. Most organizations utilize traditional investigation 
techniques, which are typically reactive, to solve cyber crimes, which could damage 
evidence that was gathered and analyzed after the occurrence of the cyber crime. 
Traditional techniques result in costly and time-consuming investigation processes. 
The methods in the investigation process need to be improved to better understand 
cyber crimes because it is a complex (Casey, 2005). For example, a proactive 
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approach should be implemented in gathering and analyzing evidence to expedite the 
investigation process. 
2.2.2 Network Forensics 
According to Almulhem (2009), network forensics extends from network security 
and computer forensics; it works with the laws and guiding principles indicated in 
the judicial system, as shown in Figure 2.1. Traditionally, forensic specialists work 
hand in hand with law enforcement officers. The former utilizes scientific techniques 
to collect, examine, analyze, and document digital evidence from digital sources and 
network security programs. These techniques are incorporated into firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems, or network devices such as routers and switches to 
uncover facts related to cyber crime (Patel et al., 2011; Pilli et al., 2010).  
 
Figure ‎2.1: Network Forensics Locations 
In early 2001, the first Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) (Palmer, 
2001) defined network forensics as “the use of scientifically proven techniques to 
collect, fuse, identify, examine, correlate, analyze, and document digital evidence 
from multiple, actively processing and transmitting digital sources for the purpose of 
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uncovering facts related to the planned intent, or measured success of unauthorized 
activities meant to disrupt, corrupt, or compromise system components as well as 
providing information to assist in response to or recovery from these activities.” This 
definition indicates that the main phases of network forensics are collection, fusion, 
identification, examination, correlation, analysis, and documentation of digital 
evidence. These phases guide other researchers in proposing new approaches for 
network forensics. The identification of the deliberate intent behind cyber crimes is 
the main goal of network forensics.    
Network forensic systems as reported by Pilli et al. (2010) can be classified 
depending on the three characteristics indicated in Figure 2.2. In general, there are 
two approaches in network forensics: proactive and reactive. Proactive network 
forensics is a new approach in live investigation that deals with the phases of 
network forensics during an attack. In contrast, reactive network forensics is a 
traditional approach that deals with cyber crime cases after a period of time, which 
consumes a considerable amount of time during the investigation phase. As reported 
by Alharbi et al. (2011a), Grobler et al. (2010), and Simson L. (2010), proactive 
forensic approaches reduce the time and cost of investigation by identifying potential 
evidence and reducing the resources needed in the investigation phase. These 
approaches are utilized in the preliminary analysis of a cyber crime and help improve 
and accelerate the decision making process. 
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Figure ‎2.2: Network Forensics System Classifications 
This research proposes a new framework to analyze evidence. The framework is 
proactive if it analyzes evidence and provides sufficient information on the intention 
behind the cyber crime and similar strategies and cases in the investigation phase 
during the occurrence of the cyber crime through the proactive depository.  
2.2.3 Main Challenges in Network Forensics 
Network forensics involves several challenges such as various data sources, data 
granularity, data integrity, data as legal evidence, privacy issues, and data analysis 
(Almulhem, 2009). Pilli et al. (2010) also reported the following challenges in 
network forensics, such as 
 Identifying useful network events and recording the minimum representative 
attribute for each event 
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 The need for a full capture of the malicious behavior to reconstruct the attack 
behavior 
 Integrated and aggregated logs and traffic data from various tools 
 Distinguishing legitimate traffic from attack traffic by extracting the features 
of the patterns of anomalous network events 
 Classification and clustering of network events 
 Parsing and analysis of complex protocols 
 Reconstruction methods that were utilized to understand the intention and 
strategy of the attacker 
 Accurate determination of the geographical location of the attacker by 
building a topological database and IP location mapping 
The above  mentioned challenges indicate knowledge gaps in network forensics. 
This study proposes a solution to fill the gap in the analysis of evidence to identify 
the intentions behind the crime and establish similar cyber crime strategies. The 
solution aims to better understand the motive and methodology of cyber crimes, 
which will help improve the quality of the investigation process. 
Network forensic processes are distributed among the general phases of 
evidence collection, preservation, analysis, and investigation. The investigation 
phase depends on the analysis phase in providing useful evidence of the cyber crime. 
Network forensic investigation is generally complex and very costly (Casey, 2005), 
and analyzing network data traffic is time consuming, error prone, and difficult 
(Simson L., 2010; Lin et al., 2009; Casey, 2007; Mathew et al., 2006; Yasinsac A. 
and Manzano Y, 2002). 
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Even the best attack detection and prevention techniques, such as IDS and IPS, 
also have limitations which are exploited by the attackers and allow the attackers to 
learn new strategies to circumvent these techniques (Benjamin et al., 2005). For 
example, a buffer overflow attack depends on a part of the execution code at a period 
of time during the operation of the program, which produces a change in the attack 
strategy. Caloyannides (2009) claims that a smart attacker has sufficient knowledge 
and skills to remove evidence of a crime, which then makes the identification of the 
real perpetrator difficult. The main reason for the difficulty, as reported by Brian 
(2006), is the complexity of the attacker’s techniques, such as using Trojan files to 
modify the nature of the network forensic tools. The network security field continues 
to develop techniques for analyzing attack behavior based on the intentions behind 
the crime (Peng et al., 2009). Most studies in the fields of IDS and IPS depend on 
alert correlation and intrusion scenario techniques to understand and analyze attack 
behavior, which still have the above mentioned limitations. 
Generally, observing and analyzing sophisticated attacks are difficult (Zhijie et 
al., 2008). Most multi-stage attacks generate huge volumes of alerts through IDS, 
which make the attack strategy difficult to recognize during the analysis process. 
Several researchers such as Alserhani et al. (2010) believe that at present, no 
technique can efficiently detect a multi-stage attack.  
Anti-forensic methods are another challenge in network forensics. Data 
concealment and overwriting techniques hinder network forensics tools from 
accomplishing their purpose, which lengthens the investigation time. Anti-forensic 
methods also affect the quality of evidence collection and the accuracy of crime 
23 
 
 
detection (Garfinkel, 2007). According to Alharbi et al. (2011b), the main reason for 
shifting to a proactive approach is to minimize the effects of anti-forensic methods. 
Attack analysis is a critical and challenging task in security management (Qin 
and Lee, 2004). The limited capability of security sensors and network monitoring 
tools makes attack observation inaccurate and incomprehensible. This research 
believe that no complete library for all the possible attack strategies in network 
security exists, which increases the difficulty of the analysis of attack evidence and 
the recognition of the attack intention and strategy. 
There is a large number of attack methods, make pattern recognition more 
difficult. According to Huang et al. (1999), changing attack patterns is a challenge in 
attack analysis, which also affects the network forensic process, especially for a 
large-scale distributed infrastructure. The growing amount of cyber crime evidence 
makes collecting significant evidence for the analysis process difficult because the 
performance of the network forensic tools changes frequently, as mentioned by 
Carrier (2009). However, Merkle (2008) stated that analyzing raw traffic in network 
forensics with the increasing amount of evidence is a complex task. Investigators 
need to identify and classify evidence to conduct an efficient analysis.     
Recent studies, such as those conducted by Mouhtaropoulos et al. (2011), 
Alharbi et al. (2011b), Grobler et al. (2010), and Rebecca (2005), reported that the 
analysis and implementation of network forensic techniques in either the private or 
public sector encounter numerous difficulties. For example, these techniques require 
expertise and a certain level of network forensic standardization. Law enforcement 
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officers and academic researchers need to collaborate in advance to improve and 
enhance the body of network forensic knowledge. Rogers and Seigfried (2004) 
believe that network forensics needs to focus more on the education, training, and 
certification sectors to improve inadequate network forensic processes. 
2.2.4 Network Forensics Analysis and Monitoring Tools 
Network forensic processes aim to resolve cyber crime cases and select a suitable 
response for such cases to discover the real perpetrators. The key to achieve this goal 
is network traffic, which is captured, recorded, and analyzed through network 
forensics to collect evidence for the analysis of cyber crimes. These processes require 
a particular tools to help investigators establish a suitable decision in response to a 
cyber crime (Pilli et al., 2010a).     
According to Pilli et al. (2010a, 2010b), Network Forensic Analysis Tools 
(NFATs) are classified into two categories based on the source code, i.e., proprietary 
and open source tools, as shown in Figure 2.3. The same authors classified the 
Network Security and Monitoring (NSM) tools based on the purpose of these tools, 
namely, for packet capturing, statistics, pattern matching, manipulation, 
fingerprinting, and IDS, as shown in Figure 2.3.  
